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Introduction 
 
The importance of the rule of law to an effective counterterrorism strategy is widely 
accepted. Adherence to rule of law values protects both the legitimacy and moral 
authority of counterterrorism policies and legislation. This paper focuses on two specific 
rule of law values: minimalism and certainty. Minimalism is concerned with issues of 
scope. Laws should be as narrowly drawn as possible in order to preserve individuals’ 
autonomy and freedom to choose, to the fullest extent possible. Certainty is concerned 
with issues of clarity. Laws should be worded as clearly as possible so that individuals 
are aware of their responsibilities and able to make informed choices about their 
actions. Narrowly, clearly drawn laws also limit the discretion vested in officials, thus 
providing protection against inconsistent or inappropriate decision-making by those 
tasked with implementing the law. 
 
The rule of law is traditionally associated with public institutions, not private technology 
companies. In the contemporary realm of counterterrorism, however, a steadfast public-
private distinction is difficult to maintain. Indeed, many have urged the importance of 
public-private partnership in responding to terrorists’ use of the internet.1 One specific 
issue that has generated much discussion has been social media companies’ regulation 
of extremist content on their platforms. Facebook’s Community Standards, the Twitter 
Rules and YouTube’s Community Guidelines all expressly prohibit content that 
promotes terrorism. Most of the discussion of these prohibitions has focused on the 
speed with which they are enforced, particularly following the attacks in Christchurch, 
New Zealand.2 This paper seeks instead to evaluate the prohibitions from the different, 
but equally important, perspective of the rule of law values of minimalism and certainty.  
 
To inform the discussion, the paper draws on the debates that have surrounded the U.K. 
‘Encouragement of Terrorism’ criminal offence. Created by the Terrorism Act 2006, and 
recently amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, this offence 
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has proved controversial from its inception for two principal reasons. 3 4 5 6 First, the 
offence expressly encompasses both direct and indirect encouragement. Critics have 
argued that the concept of indirect encouragement is too nebulous and gives the offence 
too wide a scope. Second, the framing of the offence focuses not on the purpose of the 
speaker, but on whether the potential effect of the statement is to encourage terrorism. 
This too, it has been argued, gives the offence too wide a scope. 
 
In terms of the social media companies’ prohibitions on terrorism-promoting content, 
this paper accordingly asks two questions. Do the prohibitions encompass indirect, as 
well as direct, encouragement? And, for the prohibitions to apply, must the 
encouragement of terrorism have been the purpose and/or the likely effect of the 
relevant content? The answer to neither question is clear from the wording of the 
prohibitions themselves. The paper will argue that, in terms of the values of minimalism 
and certainty, it is important that the answers to both questions are made explicit. It will 
also suggest how both questions should be answered and provide a proposed 
reformulation of the social media companies’ prohibitions on terrorism-promoting 
content. 
 
The U.K.’s Encouragement of Terrorism Offence 
The U.K.’s Encouragement of Terrorism offence contains three requirements that must 
be satisfied for a defendant to be liable. First, the defendant must have published a 
statement or caused another to publish a statement (s 1(2)(a)). A “statement” is defined 
as a “communication of any description” and includes communications “without words 
consisting of sounds or images or both” (s 20(6)). “Publishing” is defined in a similarly 
expansive manner, as “publishing [the statement] in any manner to the public”, and 
expressly includes providing an electronic service “by means of which the public have 
access to the statement” and “using such a service … to enable or to facilitate access by 
the public to [it]” (s 20(4)). The legislation’s accompanying explanatory notes explain 
that Internet Service Providers and website administrators may therefore be regarded as 
publishing statements on their platforms/websites. There is one restriction, however: 
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the statement must have been published to the public. The offence does not apply to 
private communications. 
 
The offence’s second requirement focuses on the content of the statement and its likely 
interpretation. The prosecution must show that the statement was “likely to be 
understood by a reasonable person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other 
inducement, to some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published, to the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences” (s 
1(1)). The “public” is defined as the public (or any section thereof) of any part of the UK 
or of another country, and expressly includes public meetings or gatherings (regardless 
of whether payment is required to attend) (s 20(3)).  
 
The final requirement is that the defendant either intended to (directly or indirectly) 
encourage members of the public to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or 
was reckless as to whether the statement would have this effect (s 1(2)(b)). Since proof 
of recklessness will suffice, there is no requirement to prove a terrorist purpose. There 
is, however, a defence of non-endorsement. Only available in cases of reckless 
encouragement, this defence applies where: (a) the statement neither expressed the 
defendant’s views nor had his endorsement; and, (b) in the circumstances it was clear 
that the statement neither expressed his views nor had his endorsement (s 1(6)). 
 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube’s prohibitions on terrorism-promoting content are 
considerably pithier. Facebook’s Community Standards say, “We do not allow content 
that praises [terrorists organisations or terrorists] or any acts committed by them.”7 The 
Twitter Rules state that “You may not make specific threats of violence or wish for the 
serious physical harm, death, or disease of an individual or group of people. This 
includes, but is not limited to, threatening or promoting terrorism.” 8 And YouTube’s 
Community Guidelines stipulate that “Content intended to praise, promote or aid 
violent criminal [including terrorist] organisations is not allowed on YouTube.”9 Whilst 
not suggesting that social media companies’ terms of service should contain the same 
level of detail as criminal legislation, these platforms’ prohibitions leave two key 
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questions unanswered. Do the prohibitions encompass indirect, as well as direct, 
encouragement? And, for the prohibitions to apply, must the encouragement of 
terrorism have been the purpose and/or the likely effect of the relevant content? 
 
From a rule of law perspective, it is important that these questions are answered. The 
right to freedom of speech is critical in the context of counterterrorism. As Barendt has 
stated, “We can only respond intelligently to undesirable extremist attitudes, and 
remove or reduce the reasons why they are held, if we allow them, to some extent, to be 
disseminated.”10 One of the chief criticisms of the U.K.’s Encouragement of Terrorism 
offence has been that it is overly broad and, as a result, has a chilling effect on free 
speech.11 This over-breadth blurs the boundary between, on the one hand, efforts to 
prosecute those who encourage acts of terrorism and, on the other hand, efforts to 
respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism. This apparent overlap can render 
individuals unwilling to participate in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs 
for fear of criminal prosecution and can aggravate feelings of suspicion and resentment 
on the basis that such programs are simply a pretext for spying and surveillance.12 
Indeed, one study of Islamic State (IS) Twitter activity found that suspension played an 
important role in community-building, with the majority of the accounts studied 
referring to Twitter’s use of suspension as a specific tool to persecute Muslims.13 It is 
also important that the boundaries of prohibitions on terrorism-promoting content are 
communicated as clearly as possible.14 This not only ensures that users are provided 
with the information needed to understand their rights and responsibilities when using 
the platform, enabling them to make informed decisions about the content they choose 
to post, but also restricts and guides the discretion of content moderators. This both 
limits the risk of inconsistent – or even inappropriate – decision-making and minimizes 
the potential for “censorship creep.”15 
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Definitional Clarity and the Notion of Indirect 
Encouragement 
The U.K.’s Encouragement of Terrorism offence expressly applies to both direct and 
indirect encouragement. The rationale for including indirect encouragement was so that 
the offence would also encompass people who “create the climate of hate in which 
terrorism can more easily flourish.”16 Whilst some commentators have queried the 
inclusion of more indirect forms of encouragement, such criticisms are misplaced.17 This 
is not simply because of the difficulty distinguishing between direct and indirect 
encouragement (or between different degrees of indirectness), but because such a 
distinction would be counterproductive. To focus exclusively on statements that 
encourage via a direct speech act – that is, statements that employ an explicit 
performative such as “I encourage you to …” – would so limit the scope of any 
prohibition on the encouragement of terrorism as to render it practically worthless.18 
Moreover, indirect forms of encouragement are often more persuasive. In the context of 
asking others to do something for us, indirectness may help to save their face (public 
image) needs and, in so doing, may also address our own face needs as speakers.19 
Indirectness can also serve to underline common ground between the speaker and the 
hearer, and/or construct the speaker’s identity.20 These are benefits that are well 
understood by marketers, advertisers and politicians. Members of Internet Referral 
Units have also urged the importance of removing “so-called utopian content, that is 
texts, images, and videos that praise or glorify extremist lifestyles (e.g., showing 
unrealistically peaceful scenes from bombarded regions)”, explaining that “These forms 
of propaganda may be as dangerous as graphically violent pieces because they might 
similarly - or possibly more strongly - mobilise people into action.”21 
 
To illustrate, consider the following statement, from issue one of Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s English-language online magazine Inspire: 
 
To the Muslims in America I have this to say: How can your conscience 
allow you to live in peaceful co-existence with a nation that is responsible 
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for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and 
sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the 
war against Islam and Muslims? 
 
The statement uses a requestive strategy known as “strong hint.” The two rhetorical 
questions hint at two specific requests for action: not to co-exist peacefully with America 
and not to be loyal to the American Government. The rhetorical essence of the questions 
comes from the statement’s construction of polarised identity groups, emphasising both 
the bad properties (tyranny) of the out-group (America and the American Government) 
and its actions (crimes and war leadership) against the in-group (“our own brothers and 
sisters” and “Islam and Muslims”). 
 
Accepting that indirect forms of encouragement should be included raises the question 
whether the term is too nebulous to communicate its boundaries with sufficient clarity. 
The term itself is left undefined in the U.K. legislation, with section 1(4) instead 
instructing fact-finders to consider the contents of a statement and the circumstances 
and manner of its publication when deciding whether it amounted to encouragement to 
terrorism. Whilst this seems appropriate – the meaning of any statement depends not 
only on its specific wording but also the surrounding circumstances, including the 
broader extra-linguistic context – the need to assess statements on an individualized 
basis poses a serious challenge to attempts to give advance warning of the statements 
that, in general terms, will and will not be held to amount to encouragement. The U.K. 
legislation accordingly seeks to elucidate the meaning of indirect encouragement by 
offering an illustrative example. Section 1(3) explains that a statement indirectly 
encourages terrorism if it satisfies two conditions. The first is that it glorifies the 
commission or preparation of acts of terrorism. Here, glorification means “any form of 
praise or celebration” (s 20(2)). The glorification can relate to a past or future terrorist 
act or to acts of terrorism in general (s 1(3)(a)). The second is that the statement is one 
from which members of the public “could reasonably be expected to infer that what is 
being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by [them] in 
existing circumstances” (s 1(3)(b)). 
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Whilst the glorification-plus-emulation example is useful, the U.K. legislation could 
have gone further in illustrating the meaning of indirect encouragement, in two 
respects. First, there could also have been an example focused on the denigration of an 
out-group, as the quote above from AQAP demonstrates. Second, some indication could 
also have been offered of the ways in which indirect encouragement may be realized, 
such as via statements of obligation, suggestory formulae and hints (including in the 
form of rhetorical questions). Together, these would elaborate the meaning of indirect 
encouragement still further. 
 
Purpose and/or Likely Effect 
As explained above, the U.K.’s Encouragement of Terrorism offence focuses on how the 
statement in question is likely to be understood by “some or all of the members of the 
public to whom it is published” (s 1(1)). When combined with the express inclusion 
within the offence of indirect encouragement, this focus on how the statement would be 
construed (by perhaps only a small minority of its audience) led some to express 
concern that the offence would apply to statements that express understanding and 
which, as a result, have the effect of providing encouragement. An example that was 
discussed during the Parliamentary debates on the legislation was Cherie Blair’s 
comment at a charity event in 2002, referring to Palestinian suicide bombers, that “As 
long as young people feel they have got no hope but to blow themselves up you are never 
going to make progress”. These concerns about the offence’s reach were exacerbated by 
the breadth of the U.K.’s statutory definition of terrorism, in particular its lack of any 
exception for just cause.22 23 Since the actions of Nelson Mandela in the early 1960s fall 
within this definition, publishing a statement that celebrates these actions will amount 
to the (indirect) encouragement of terrorism if some of those to whom it is addressed 
could reasonably infer from the statement that Mandela’s actions are being glorified as 
conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances.24 
 
The underlying difficulty here is that the U.K. offense ignores the fact that persuasion is, 
by its very nature, a purposive activity. According to speech act theory, a speaker’s 
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intention is the key aspect to consider in determining the intrinsic meaning of a speech 
act.25 Yet it is sufficient for the U.K. offense that the statement was likely to have been 
understood by its audience as (direct or indirect) encouragement to terrorism and that 
the maker of the statement was reckless as to this possibility. Proof that their purpose in 
publishing the statement was to encourage terrorism is not necessary. The practical 
upshot is that, in the U.K., someone may be convicted of encouraging terrorism even if 
their publication of the statement was, truly speaking, not an act of encouragement at 
all. 
 
The U.K. Government has responded to criticisms of the breadth of the Encouragement 
of Terrorism offense by stating that, in practice, prosecutions may only be brought with 
the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (s 19). This reliance on executive 
discretion has been described by the U.K. Supreme Court as an abdication of legislative 
responsibility.26 It delegates to an unelected official the decision whether an activity 
should be treated as criminal for the purposes of prosecution and “leaves  citizens  
unclear  as  to  whether  or  not  their  actions  or  projected  actions  are  liable  to  be  
treated  by  the  prosecution  authorities  as  effectively  innocent or criminal.”27 By 
analogy, broadly worded prohibitions in social media companies’ terms of service fail to 
make clear to users whether content they post will be treated as impermissible and 
places this decision in the hands of the content moderator responding to the 
referral/appeal.  
 
To avoid this combination of overly-broad definition and reliance on individual 
discretion, social media companies’ prohibitions on terrorism-promoting content 
should reflect the nature of persuasion as a purposive activity and be explicitly limited to 
instances where content is posted with the objective of encouraging terrorism. There are 
two possible objections to this proposal. The first concerns its practicality. On the 
biggest platforms, the vast majority of content is removed automatically. Are machines 
able to discern the purpose for which content is posted? Progress is being made in this 
respect: Facebook’s uses of artificial intelligence already include language 
understanding (analysing text that has been removed for praising or supporting terrorist 
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organisations in order to develop text-based signals that can go into machine learning 
algorithms to detect similar future posts).28 In any event, in practice most automated 
decisions to remove content are based on behavioural cues, such as account features 
(e.g., how long ago it was opened, how often it posts messages) and message behaviour 
(e.g., including trending or unrelated hashtags). Decisions based on the content of a post 
still rely heavily on human involvement.29 And there is evidence to suggest that the 
purpose for which content is posted is already a key criterion in this context.30 31 The 
second possible objection is that to require a terrorist purpose would unduly limit social 
media companies’ prohibitions on terrorism-promoting content. In response, it should 
be noted that content that is posted without any intention to promote terrorism may 
nonetheless fall foul of other prohibitions, such as those aimed at hate speech.32 More 
generally, aside from the fact that, as explained above, encouragement is by its very 
nature a purposive activity, this objection also undervalues the importance to 
counterterrorism of freedom of speech. Only removing content that is posted with the 
objective of encouraging terrorism would be consistent with the First Amendment,33 
protect ideological debate and discussion and avoid generating the feelings of suspicion 
and resentment that have plagued the U.K.’s Encouragement of Terrorism offense. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper began by identifying two questions that Facebook, Twitter and YouTube’s 
prohibitions on terrorism-promoting content currently do not answer: do the 
prohibitions encompass indirect, as well as direct, encouragement? And, for the 
prohibitions to apply, must the encouragement of terrorism have been the purpose 
and/or the likely effect of the relevant content? Based on an examination of the U.K.’s 
Encouragement of Terrorism offence, it has been argued: first, that indirect 
encouragement should be encompassed but that more is needed to clearly communicate 
the boundaries of the term indirect encouragement; and, second, that a focus on the 
likely effect of a statement, instead of the purpose for which it was made, has 
detrimental consequences for freedom of speech and ideological discussion.  
Drawing on this analysis, the paper offers the following reformulation of social media 
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companies’ prohibitions on terrorism-promoting content: 
 
It is forbidden to post content that purposely encourages terrorism, either 
directly or indirectly. Indirect encouragement of terrorism includes the use 
of statements, suggestions or hints (including rhetorical questions) to 
either (a) denigrate or dehumanise others or (b) glorify past acts of 
terrorism in such a way as to imply that others should emulate them. 
 
This reformulation would ensure that the ambit of the prohibition on terrorism-
promoting content is both carefully circumscribed and clearly communicated to users. 
Such respect for the rule of law values of certainty and minimalism is of vital importance 
in counterterrorism. 
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